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I.

Introduction

It is not infrequently remarked that the golden age of writers on
international law is long over. While the treatises of the discipline’s
founding figures were often treated as authoritative, the scholarship of
their successors has been relegated to the formal status of a “subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of [international] law.”1 But it has
also been suggested that the work of international legal scholars is at
present more important than ever, not least in digesting the everexpanding evidence of international practice in order to distill the
unwritten rules of customary international law—and sometimes to
advocate for their progressive development. This significant role
requires an integrity of method that promotes not only the credibility
of a particular study, but also the validity of international law more
broadly, and the influence of authors in shaping it. Before examining
contemporary problems that might stymie such an impact, and
*

Dr. Omri Sender advises and acts for States, international organizations,
and multinational corporations on matters across the full breadth of
public international law; he has also written extensively on the sources of
international law and international law-making, among other issues of the
discipline. The present article is based on remarks delivered in September
2021 at the annual international law symposium at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, titled “The Academy and International Law: A
Catalyst for Change and Innovation.”

1.

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.1(d), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
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suggesting why it is essential that they are addressed, it will be
convenient to recall the place of writings in international law in general.

II. The Place of Writings in International Law
International law owes a great deal to the writings of jurists, who
were the first to give it structure and directly influenced its content at
an earlier period when ‘law-making’ treaties and judicial
pronouncements were largely absent. Scholars such as Vitoria, Suarez,
Gentili, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff, and Vattel are often regarded as the
founders of international law, with authors such as Hall, Westlake, and
Oppenheim following in their footsteps by offering systematic
expositions of a law of nations that was for the most part still
unwritten.2 Up to the end of the nineteenth century, international law
was indeed largely “to be collected from the practice of different
nations, and the authority of writers.”3 These writers on international
law were cited in diplomatic correspondence and were considered as
being among the principal sources of international law.4 They also had
“in a sense to take the place of the judges and . . . to pronounce whether
there is an established custom or not, whether there is a usage only in
contradistinction to a custom, whether a recognized usage has now
ripened into a custom, and the like.”5 Such “opinions of famous writers
on international law” were among the important factors influencing the
growth of international law,6 the authority of those pronouncing them
being based on the view that “as a rule they represented the general

2.

See generally FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTIONES THEOLOGICAE (1557);
FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS AC DEO LEGISLATORE (1612);
ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES (1598); HUGO GROTIUS, DE
JURE BELLI AC PACIS (1625); SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ELEMENTA
JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS (1666); CHRISTIAN WOLFF, THE LAW OF
NATIONS (1749); EMER DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS (1758); WILLIAM
EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1880); JOHN
WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1894);
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (1905).

3.

Triquet v. Bath (1764) 3 Burrows, 1478.

4.

HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 15 (Little, Brown
& Co., 8th ed. 1866).

5.

Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Tasks and
Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 315 (1908).

6.

LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, VOL. I (PEACE) 24
(2d. ed., 1912). For some notable early examples of recourse to writings,
see In re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] AC 586 (UKPC); Schooner Exch.
v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 143–46 (1812); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900).
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consent of men, their reputation proving that they represent many
persons besides them.”7
The rise of positivism, with its emphasis on State sovereignty,
precluded any formal recognition of international lawmaking by private
authors. With it came the great increase in treaty-making as well as
the expansion of case law dealing with international law, both of which
have reduced the importance of writings in expounding the existing law.
The Privy Council, for instance, said in 1920:
[V]aluable as the opinions of learned and distinguished writers
must always be, as aids to a full and exact comprehension of a
systematic Law of Nations, prize courts must always attach chief
importance to the current of decisions, and the more the field is
covered by decided cases the less becomes the authority of
commentators and jurists.8

The growing availability of official records of State practice and
collections of treaties,9 the growth of international organizations in
which States constantly interact, and the convocation from time to time
of intergovernmental codification conferences,10 have had a similar
effect.
Yet the view has also been expressed that writings on international
law are at present “hardly the poor cousins of international law.”11 In
7.

Hersch Lauterpacht, Westlake and Present Day International Law, 15
ECONOMICA 307, 318 (1925) (describing Westlake’s approach as to the
authority of the opinions of international publicists); see also WHEATON,
supra note 4, at 22 (suggesting that text-writers of authority “are
witnesses of the sentiments and usages of civilized nations, and the weight
of their testimony increases every time that their authority is invoked by
statesmen, and every year that passes without the rules laid down in their
works being impugned by the avowal of contrary principles”).

8.

Judicial Committee on the Privy Council: The Hilding and Other Vessels
(Part Cargoes Ex), 15 AM. J. INT’L L. 593, 596 (1921).

9.

See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT
BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 24 (1958).

10.

See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment,
1969 I.C.J. 3, 156–57 (Feb. 20) (dissenting opinion by Vice-President
Koretsky) (suggesting that in such cases it was no longer indispensable,
for determining the existence of certain rules of international law, “to
gather the relevant data brick by brick, as it were, from governmental
acts, declarations, diplomatic notes, agreements and treaties, mostly on
concrete matters”).

11.

Jan Paulsson, Scholarship as Law, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 183, 189
(Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., copy. 2011) (suggesting a resurgence
of influence on the part of scholars by pointing out that “international
ON
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the modern era, some have suggested, where the mass of material
evidence of customary international law is so large and disordered,
authors are perhaps of greater importance than ever before, for they
alone can properly fulfill the particular task of distilling and clarifying
the law in a way that is not open to a court which has to focus on the
disposal of a particular problem.12 Others have noted that “[w]hile the
availability of other sources of information may have altered the nature
of the function of ‘publicists’ as recorders of the practice of States, their
part as its qualified interpreters cannot always be disregarded.”13 Still
others maintain that:
the role of contemporary doctrine . . . has not diminished, but
has rather changed its character. The writers simply relieve the
judge, and, in general, all those whose task it is to solve problems
of international law. In particular, writers supply ready answers
to the question as to whether a certain customary rule of
international law is already (or still) binding.14

Such observations are corroborated by the fact that the literature on
international law is consulted by judges and others as a matter of
law has become a kaleidoscope; the need for a systematic exposition is
growing”).
12.

Robert Y. Jennings, What Is International Law and How Do We Tell It
When We See It?, 37 SCHWEITZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FÜR INTERNATIONALES
RECHT 59, 78–79 (1981), reprinted in SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27,
46–47 (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 2000). See also W. Michael Reisman,
Jonathan I. Charney: An Appreciation, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 23, 24–
25 (2003) (suggesting that because identifying customary international law
is a very challenging intellectual task, it is “the distinctive responsibility of
the international legal scholar”); JAMES-LESLIE BRIERLY, RÈGLES
GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT DE LA PAIX 71 (1936) (suggesting that it was up to
the writers to tidy up the mess of materials that presents itself on the
international plane, explaining that examining the evidence of customary
international law, establishing its value and formulating the conclusions to
which it seems to lead was among the most important services that the
writers on international law can render).

13.

LAUTERPACHT, supra note 9, at 25; see also Paul W. Kahn, Nuclear
Weapons and the Rule of Law, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POLY. 349, 370
(1999) (“The international legal scholar takes on the burden of moving from
the particular to the general. He or she announces that a principle has been
accepted in a convention or has passed from convention to custom, i.e.,
from discrete political practices to a general rule of law. By announcing a
rule of law, the scholar fills the logical void raised by the traditional
conundrum of the origins of customary law, i.e., how can a practice become
law, if a necessary condition of law is that the practice be pursued with an
understanding—opinio juris—that it is already law.”).

14.

KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (2d rev. ed.
1993).
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course, and no doubt plays a substantial part in shaping juridical
opinion.
The auxiliary role of writings in determining rules of international
law is enshrined in Article 38.1(d) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”), which refers to “the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as [a] subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.”15 This century-old text, first
adopted for the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”),
recognizes the valuable role that writings may play in indicating
whether a certain rule exists and how it might apply to the
circumstances of a particular case. But it equally makes it clear that
“the judge should only use [doctrine] in a supplementary way to clarify
the rules of international law.”16 Chief Justice Cockburn famously
expressed this sentiment in the Franconia case: “writers on
international law, however valuable their labours may be in elucidating
and ascertaining the principles and rules of law, cannot make the law.
To be binding, the law must have received the assent of the nations
who are to be bound by it.”17
The preparatory work that led to Article 38.1(d) of the ICJ Statute
offers little guidance as to what precisely was to fall under the term
“teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations.”18 It seems clear, however, that the members of the Advisory
Committee of Jurists who proposed this text for the Statute of the
PCIJ—much like those who retained it in the Statute of the ICJ—
probably had in mind the writings of only a handful of distinguished
writers, and perhaps the major treatises. The exponential proliferation
of international legal writing would happen only later.

15.

ICJ Statute, supra note 1.

16.

ADVISORY COMM. OF JURISTS, PERMANENT CT. OF INT’L JUST., PROCÈSVERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE: JUNE 16TH–JULY
24TH 1920, at 336 (1920) [hereinafter PROCÈS-VERBAUX] (statement of the
President, Baron Descamps).

17.

R v. Keyn (The Franconia Case) [1876] 2 Exch. Div. 63 (Crown Case
Reserved) at 202 (Eng.). See also West Rand Central Gold Mining
Company, Ltd. v. The King [1905] 2 KB 391 at 407, reprinted in 1 AM.
J. INT’L L. 217, 230–31 (1907); Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine
[1948] 81 Lloyd’s List LR 277 (PC) at 284.

18.

The term “publicists” may seem a curious one in English; the members of
the Advisory Committee of Jurists had also referred to “authors” and to
“writers.” See PROCÈS-VERBAUX, supra note 16, at 323, 344, 351. The word
“publicists” was a translation of the French text of the Statute, which refers
to publicistes—that is, persons learned in public law (as opposed to those
who teach or practice private law). Everyone who professes public
international law (as opposed to private international law) in a French
university is by definition a professor of public law.

57

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 54 (2022)
The Importance of Being Earnest: Purpose and Method in Scholarship on
International Law

Some have suggested that what really needs to be considered are
not the writings of individuals but the writings of publicists in general,
in order to ascertain any concordant views among them,19 as such
general agreement among qualified authors would naturally be given
greater weight in seeking to determine whether a rule of international
law exists. This idea finds support in the preparatory work of the
Advisory Committee of Jurists,20 as well as in the French text of Article
38.1(d), with its mention of la doctrine.21 The ICJ, which has hardly
ever referred to writings (as opposed to its judges writing
individually),22 made a general reference in the Nottebohm case both to
19.

Robert Jennings, Reflections on the Subsidiary Means for the
Determination of Rules of Law, STUDI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE IN
ONORE DI GAETANO ARANGIO RUIZ 319 (2003), reprinted in BRITISH
CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1915–2015, at 845, 849 (Jill Barret
& Jean-Pierre Gauci eds., 2021) (“This term ‘teachings’ was presumably an
attempt at a translation of the French ‘doctrine’, and it might in fact have
been better translated simply as ‘doctrine’. The idea of doctrine seems to
introduce a new factor. It suggests that an examination of the works of
publicists in the plural, may be used to find out whether a view is one which
may be said to constitute a teaching or doctrine that is accepted by
publicists in general or at any rate by a considerable number of them”);
WOLFKE, supra note 14, at 156 (“The importance of doctrine is no longer
based on certain individual celebrities, but above all upon the concordant
opinions of writers representing various legal and social systems.”).

20.

Baron Descamps referred to “the concurrent teaching of the authors
whose opinions have authority” while invoking Chancellor Kent’s saying
that “when the greater part of jurisconsults agree upon a certain rule—
the presumption in favor of that rule becomes so strong, that only a person
who makes a mock of justice would gainsay it.” He also referred to
“coinciding doctrines of jurists” (supported by Lord Phillimore who later
spoke of “the works of writers who agree upon a certain point”), and he
preferred to see a reference in the Statute not to “the opinions” of writers
but to “coinciding doctrines.” De Lapradelle similarly said that “[i]f it
were wished to include doctrine as a source it should be at any rate limited
to coinciding doctrines of qualified authors in the countries concerned in
the case,” but nevertheless suggested that “the publicists are hardly ever
agreed on a point of law.” It was in order to satisfy him that the word
“coinciding” was dropped from the text, but he eventually voted against
the inclusion of what was to become paragraph (d), saying that “[t]he
source of law referred to under this heading could not be clearly defined.
Laws, customs, and general principles of law could not be applied without
reference to jurisprudence and teaching.” PROCÈS-VERBAUX, supra note
16, at 323, 331–32, 334–36, 337, 584.

21.

Id. at 567.

22.

See Michael Peil, Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the
Use of Doctrine by the International Court of Justice, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L
& COMPAR. L. 136 (2012); SONDER TORP HELMERSEN, THE APPLICATION OF
TEACHINGS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (2021). The Court’s
reluctance to cite the work of individual authors may well reflect a desire to
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“the writings of publicists” and to “the opinions of writers,”23 and in
the advisory opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, it noted “the view of the vast majority of States as well as
writers.”24 The PCIJ had surveyed in the Lotus case the “teachings of
publicists” (expressly leaving aside “the question as to what their value
may be from the point of view of establishing the existence of a rule of
customary law”), only to emphasize that no unanimity of opinion could
be established.25
Whatever may have been the position in the past, nowadays the
sheer volume of publications in the field of international law (and
certain tendencies therein, discussed below) would hardly make it
feasible to establish a concordant view in all cases. There is, of course,
the filter provided by the words “the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations,” but this curious phrase seems to require an
inherently subjective appreciation: Georg Schwarzenberger observed
that “[i]t is about as difficult to find out who are the most highly
qualified publicists in the field of international law as to say with any
claim to objectivity what is a peace-loving nation within the meaning

avoid being seen as making invidious distinctions among publicists. Jennings,
supra note 19, at 847. It may also be the case that “the Court prefers, if
possible, to base itself on evidence more obviously emanating from States or
from tribunals invested by States with law-determining authority.”
HUMPHRY WALDOCK, GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 96
(1962).
23.

The Nottebohm Case (second phase) (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955
I.C.J. 4, 22–23 (April 6) (“Similarly, the courts of third States, when they
have before them an individual whom two other States hold to be their
national, seek to resolve the conflict by having recourse to international
criteria and their prevailing tendency is to prefer the real and effective
nationality. The same tendency prevails in the writings of publicists and in
practice . . . . According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial
decisions and to the opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having
as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence,
interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights
and duties.”).

24.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 85 (July 8). But see Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. (intervening)), Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 351,
¶ 392 n.1 (Sept. 11) (exhibiting a rare exception where “an article by Sir
Cecil Hurst, later President of the Permanent Court of International
Justice” was cited by a Chamber of the Court).

25.

S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 26 (Sept. 7)
(finding that what “writers teach” did not fully support the view advanced
by France).
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of the Charter of the United Nations.”26 Baron Descamps had initially
spoken in the Advisory Committee of Jurists of “publicists carrying
authority,” and Lord Phillimore remarked that “[t]here is no need to
say, that only the opinions of widely recognised authors were in
question.”27 The PCIJ referred in one case to “the teachings of legal
authorities,”28 a phrase that brings to mind the warning issued by a
former judge of that Court, according to which “[w]riters, even dead
ones, seldom deserve the compliment paid in calling them
‘authorities.’”29
Those who are “the most highly qualified” are, in the words of the
U.S. Supreme Court, the “jurists and commentators who by years of
labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.”30 The International
Law Commission (“ILC”) has similarly drawn attention to “the

26.

Georg Schwarzenberger, The Inductive Approach to International Law,
60 HARV. L. REV. 539, 559–560 (1947). See also Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir,
ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, Decision on the Requests for Leave to File
Observations Pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, the Request for Leave to Reply and Further Processes in the
Appeal, ¶ 10 (May 21, 2018) (the ICC Appeals Chamber inviting, rather
curiously, only “the most senior” of those scholars who had done research
and writing on the relevant legal questions to submit written observations
and to participate in the oral hearings, including on the question whether
customary international law afforded immunity that would bar the Court
from exercising its jurisdiction).

27.

PROCÈS-VERBAUX, supra note 16, at 319, 333. A later suggestion by Baron
Descamps and Lord Phillimore, as amended by Ricci-Busatti, referred to
“opinions of the best qualified writers of the various countries.” Id. at 351.

28.

Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment,
1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6, at 20 (Aug. 25).

29.

Manley O. Hudson, Legal Foundations of International Relations, 2
NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 11, 19 (1949).

30.

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). In an amici curiae brief
submitted to the United States Supreme Court in support of the
respondents in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Governments of the
United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands referred to “respected
jurists.” Brief for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108
(2013) (No. 10-1491). See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621
F.3d 111, 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2010) (referring to certain “renowned professors
of international law” as “authorities [that] demonstrate[d] that imposing
liability on corporations for violations of customary international law has
not attained a discernible, much less universal, acceptance among nations
of the world in their relations inter se”).
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writings of those who are eminent in the field.”31 But the ILC has also
observed that “[i]n the final analysis, however, it is the quality of the
particular writing that matters rather than the reputation of the
author.”32 The Commission further specified, in the commentary to its
Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, that
“among the factors to be considered in this regard are the approach
adopted by the author to the identification of customary international
law and the extent to which his or her text remains loyal to it.”33 These
words highlight not only the need to consider the merits of any given
study and the extent to which the particular circumstances of its author
may have colored his or her views; they are also there in recognition of
the fact that the writers on international law may well have an
important part to play in criticizing the existing rules and in proposing
new ones.34 A shining example is the influence of authors in promoting
the concept of jus cogens, and indeed the law of human rights. Some
writers had a formative influence over the development of particular
rules, such as Gidel on the law of the sea. It should go without saying
that the task of stating the existing law is fundamentally different from
the task of saying what the law might or should one day become.

31.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary
International Law, with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 151 (2018)
[hereinafter Draft Conclusions].

32.

Id.; see also LAUTERPACHT, supra note 9, at 24 (referring to “recognized
competence, impartiality and authority”); Anthony D’Amato, What Does
It Mean to Be an Internationalist?, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 102, 104 (1989)
(suggesting that “the term ‘highly qualified publicists,’ of course, is
synonymous with . . . ‘respected scholars’ . . . [it] selects from the class of
scholars those whose writings have commended themselves, through
objectivity of reporting and judgment, to the international legal
community”); Georg Schwarzenberger, The Province of the Doctrine of
International Law, in 9 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1956, at 235, 238–39
(George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberg eds., 1956) (referring to the
“tests which are implied in Article 38 of the Statute of the World Court:
uncompromising independence, an international outlook undeflected by any
particular ‘cause,’ and unceasing efforts at more complete mastery of one’s
own chosen subject”); S.T. Helmersen, Finding ‘the Most Highly Qualified
Publicists’: Lessons from the International Court of Justice, 30 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 509–35 (2019).

33.

Draft Conclusions, supra note 31, at 151.

34.

One may recall here the words of Robert Ward: “Of so great consequence
are sometimes the silent exertions of the closet, to the more active and
louder professions which contend with it for the government of the world.”
2 ROBERT WARD, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATION AND HISTORY OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE 364 (1795).
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III. Present-Day Perils
The contemporary reader may perhaps find this hard to believe,
but the writers on international law were once criticized for being too
conservative. A century ago, Manley O. Hudson described them as
mostly working over materials that had been handed down to them,
and he considered it a very serious matter “that law-writers frequently
express not the ideas of their own time, but the ideas of some preceding
generation.”35 More specifically, Hudson bemoaned:
They tend to regard contemporaneous thought and
contemporaneous practice as more ephemeral than the traditions
received from their teachers, and hence they state as accepted
that which a preceding generation thought and did. Imitation is
a temptation to which they continually yield, and it is only
increased by their willingness to deal with doctrine as if it were
always constant and consistent.36

That is no longer the case today, and we are better for it. But all
too often the scholarship is once again divorced from international law
as it operates in the real world, even if in quite a different way. As
Professor Jan Klabbers put it, “[i]nternational law, in the academy, is
no longer about what states do, but has become about what
international lawyers do. We have lost touch with legal practice, and
the discipline has become transfixed by methodological debates.”37 Sir
Christopher Greenwood sounded a similar alarm, aptly observing that
“[w]riters on international law should never be the mere scribes of state
practice but there are worrying indications of a trend in international
legal scholarship that is both ignorant of and determinedly detached
from the practice of international law.”38
Much of what is published nowadays on international law does
indeed suffer in this way. Questions are raised—and answered—not
only without the knowledge that they are rooted in earlier experiences
of international law, but also without due regard to the overriding
reality of international relations. State practice is glossed over, surveyed
partially or inaccurately, or paid only lip service. Assertions are made
without sufficient knowledge of how the rules and legal institutions that
make up the international legal system work in practice. Arguments are
35.

Manley O. Hudson, Prospect for International Law in the Twentieth
Century, 10 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 437 (1925).

36.

Id.

37.

Jan Klabbers, On Epistemic Universalism and the Melancholy of
International Law, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1057, 1062 (2018).

38.

Christopher Greenwood, The Practice of International Law: Threats,
Challenges, and Opportunities, 112 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 161, 167 (2018).
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put forward that bring to mind the memorable words of the Privy
Council from 1934: “their Lordships are almost tempted to say that a
little common sense is a valuable quality in the interpretation of
international law.”39
In some cases, it seems that the writers are content with writing
for one another. They seem to forget—perhaps they do not much care—
that their influential predecessors did not remain secluded within the
ivory tower of academia. Figures such as Hugo Grotius, Alberico
Gentili, and Friedrich Fromhold von Martens, as Sir Michael Wood
reminds us, “were first and foremost practitioners, with their writings
being closely associated with their practice.”40 It is in this tradition, and
out of his own exemplary personal experience, that the former president
of the ICJ, Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, advised that “one has to
combine academic activity with some real-world activity.”41 The two
pursuits, he said, “support each other: you are a better professor if you
practise law; you are a better practitioner if you have an academic
background.”42
Another contemporary challenge is posed by the increasing
specialization of the writers on international law. If the concern about
fragmentation of the law at the hands of international courts and
tribunals has by now largely subsided,43 the threat to the unity of the
discipline presently lies in the fact that international law is increasingly
taught, and thought of, through narrow prisms of specialized
branches.44 Professor Jorge Viñuales has pointed in this context to an
“inability to think out of the (branch) box,” that is, “the ‘framing’ of a
real-life problem [as being limited] to the artificial confines of a ‘branch’
rather than encompassing the wider body of rules (whatever the
branch) which may be relevant to it.”45 That may well be observed in
some of the writings on international law as it relates to the
environment, international criminal law, and international human
rights law, which often neglect to consider not only the implications of
the thesis presented for other fields, such as diplomatic relations or the
39.

In re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934], AC 586 (Eng.).

40.

MICHAEL WOOD, COURSES OF THE SUMMER SCHOOL ON PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN PRACTICE 32 (2022).

41.

ANTONIO CASSESE, FIVE MASTERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (2011).

42.

Id.

43.

See A FAREWELL TO FRAGMENTATION: REASSERTION AND CONVERGENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mads Andenas & Eirik Bjorge eds., 2006).

44.

Klabbers, supra note 37.

45.

Jorge Viñuales, The Forgotten Constitution: The UN Friendly Relations
Declaration at 50, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/
the-forgotten-constitution-the-un-friendly-relations-declaration-at-50/
[https://perma.cc/W245-ETZL].
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laws of war, but also for the fundamental principles underlying
international law as a whole. One can perhaps no longer expect
international lawyers to keep abreast of all the activities of States (and
others) in all walks of international life; but they must not lose sight of
the wood for the trees. To quote Judge Greenwood once more,
“[i]nternational law is not a series of fragmented specialist and selfcontained bodies of law, each of which functions in isolation from the
others; it is a single, unified system of law.”46
Yet another problem that writings not infrequently suffer from,
which has been with us some time now, is no less acute: the blurring of
the line between lex lata and lex ferenda—between actual and desirable
law.47 The distinction between law and policy is, of course, an essential
one. Without it, “any present law cannot be held as a constraining
factor in social decision.”48 Too often, however, as Sir Robert Jennings
wrote, “missionary zeal tends to enter into the calculation, greatly
tempting an enthusiastic ‘publicist’ to be less than clear about the
distinction.”49 In so doing, the writer—no doubt well-meaning—dresses
his or her political views in juridical guise. Instead of criticizing a
certain existing rule and calling for its replacement, or campaigning for
a new rule to be adopted where there is none, he or she overstates the
case and misrepresents the law that is in force.
Failings of this kind are particularly evident in some of the
contemporary scholarship concerned with customary international law.
Take, for instance, the numerous writings on the immunities of State
officials from foreign domestic jurisdiction. While some authors
demonstrate that the traditional rules conferring immunity remain
46.

Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Demo. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2012
I.C.J. 324, 394 (June 19) (declaration by Greenwood, J.).

47.

Writing a century ago, Oppenheim suggested that “[s]cience may also test
and criticize, from the politico-jural standpoint, the existing rules of
customary or enacted law, but, on the other hand, it may not contest their
operation and applicability, even if convinced of their worthlessness. It must
not be said that these are obvious matters and therefore do not need special
emphasis. There are many recognized rules of customary law the
operativeness of which is challenged by this or that writer because they
offend his sense of what is right and proper . . . Here they are putting their
politico-jural convictions in the place of a generally recognized rule of law.”
LASSA OPPENHEIM, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1921).

48.

MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 209 (Cambridge Univ. Press reprt.,
2005).

49.

Robert Jennings, International Law Reform and Progressive Development,
in LIBER AMICORUM: PROFESSOR IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDEN IN HONOR OF
HIS 80TH BIRTHDAY 325, 333 (Gerhard Hafner et al. eds., 1998) (noting,
however, that “this use as a rhetorical weapon of the lack of a clear
boundary between proposal and existing law is not confined to writers”).
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firmly rooted in international law, even where the commission of serious
international crimes is alleged, others suggest there is a visible ‘trend’
denying such immunity, and still others assert that immunity is not at
all afforded under the international law in force. Needless to say, they
cannot all be right. The determination of customary international law
may not be an exact science; but there is no excuse for failing to
properly take into account the views pronounced on this issue by States,
or indeed to qualify an argument when necessary. Allowing
preconceived ideas of what is ‘right’ to guide the inquiry and determine
its outcome is not a legitimate way to ascertain the law, either.
Even more puzzling is the tendency of some authors to depict
customary international law as defunct or obsolete, ignoring the fact
that governments, judicial institutions, and other actors continue to
invoke and apply this principal source of international law on a daily
basis.50 And then there are those who set out to describe what
customary international law “really is” and how we all ought to think
about it, unperturbed by the fact that States—the primary lawmakers
in the international community—continue to pledge their allegiance to
the persistent formula of ‘a general practice accepted as law.51 Many
writings have undoubtedly contributed greatly to better understanding
of customary international law, but others exemplify the concern that
“especially wherever scholarly discussion starts to feed on itself, it loses
touch with reality.”52
All of this cannot be brushed aside as a purely academic matter,
for it may well have serious consequences in the real world. Municipal
judges, for instance, are not invariably well versed in international law,
and may be swayed in one direction or another by writings to which
they turn for impartial guidance in a particular case. Larger
considerations, too, call for an integrity of method and a balanced
50.

See Herbert W. Briggs, The Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case and Proof of
Customary International Law, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 728, 729 (1951) (observing
that “[t]heoretical difficulties involved in the determination of these elements
[of customary international law] or of the methods and procedures by which
customary rules of international law are created or evolve from nonobligatory practice often receive more attention than the fact that in a given
case courts have relatively little difficulty in determining whether or not an
applicable rule of customary international law exists”); IAN BROWNLIE, THE
RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE
FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 21 (1998) (referring in
particular to the constituent element of opinio juris in observing that the
question of proof of customary international law “does not present as much
difficulty as the writers have anticipated”).

51.

See G.A. Res. 73/203, at 2 (Dec. 20, 2018).
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Hans W. Baade, Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises: An
Introductory Survey, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 407, 413 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980).
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exposition of any subject matter in the literature on international law.
To these considerations we now turn.

IV. The Importance of Being Earnest
The determination of rules of international law should be carried
out with an earnest solicitude by all those engaged in the task, not only
writers. But the position of scholarship in the international legal
system, and the present reality in which it is produced and consulted,
may justify recalling why it is, exactly, that such diligence is required.
Four closely related reasons may be listed.
First, it is crucial for the authority of international law to maintain
a distinction between law and non-law. If interest and ambition—
however well-intentioned—are given juridical guise and the line cannot
be drawn clearly between law and proposal, international law will not
retain the confidence of those to whom it is addressed. Determining the
existence of rules without a degree of assurance that the international
community is indeed committed to them as obligatory risks the
effectiveness and legitimacy not only of the specific rule in question,
but ultimately of the system as a whole.53 The writer ought therefore
to clearly see the difference between lex lata and lex ferenda: if not, he
or she might end up undermining international law rather than
encouraging its administration. “Pseudo-law,” as Professor Bin Cheng
has remarked, “can be the worst enemy of the Rule of Law.”54
None of this is to say that writers should not shoulder the task of
contributing to the progressive development of the law, or proposing
wholly new law. As already noted, there is tremendous value in
scholarly assessment that tests and criticizes international law. But
even if it were true that “[i]n the absence of a World Parliament, truly
ambitious—perhaps ‘revolutionary’—scholarship appears to offer a
singular hope for the derivation of common principles,”55 that work
must be done transparently.56 It is profitable to quote once more the
words of Jennings, which remain as valid today as they were over thirty
years ago:
It is undeniably important that scholars with imagination and
vision should publish ideas for better international law. Good
ideas, if they are timely and blessed by good fortune, possibly
53.

See Jonathan I. Charney, Customary International Law in the Nicaragua
Case Judgment on the Merits, 1 HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L. 16, 24 (1988).
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Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant”
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accomplish as much as, or more than, the diplomatic conferences,
with their promising drafts of articles, so beloved by those who
seek to further the “progressive development” of international
law. Yet it is important not to carry the campaign for a “new”
international law so far as possibly to weaken the authority and
respect which our present international law enjoys. And it is still
important to distinguish between lege lata and proposals de lege
ferenda; not merely as a technical matter but because of the trap
into which the layman so easily falls of supposing all international
law to be a proposal.57

Second, any scholarly investigation that seeks to define the
restrictions placed by international law upon the sovereignty that
States continue to hold so dear must necessarily be rigorous and
realistic, for otherwise it will easily be rejected by them. As the German
Federal Constitutional Court has stressed, “[d]ue to the fundamental
obligation of all States expressed therein, high requirements must be
placed on the establishment of a general rule of international law.”58
An emphasis on facts and regard for reality in offering a meticulous and
dispassionate evaluation of the law, will make the conclusion presented
by the writer legitimate and reliable, and thus difficult to question or
ignore as a unilateral attempt at law-making. Philip Allott’s
observation comes readily to mind:
[A]n international lawyer who persists in finding rules of
international law which governments, international tribunals and
his lawyer-colleagues never or seldom thereafter treat as law, may
be on the side of the angels but will not in the end serve the useful
purpose of contributing to the improvement of the quality of
relations between States.59

Third, when scholarship is diligent and objective, it is a credit to
the status and stature of its author, which in turn allows him or her to
exercise real and legitimate influence. Writings that are thorough and
realistic will continue to be of much needed assistance to those who
apply international law to actual situations, whether in ministries of
foreign affairs, national courts, international tribunals, or elsewhere.
They will also carry greater authority, and draw respectful attention,
when they put forward proposals for a change in the law. To the extent
57.

Robert Y. Jennings, An International Lawyer Takes Stock, 39 INT’L &
COMPAR. L.Q. 513, 527–28 (1990).
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BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 79, 105 (1971).

67

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 54 (2022)
The Importance of Being Earnest: Purpose and Method in Scholarship on
International Law

that the increasingly diverging views among writers on many subjects
in the field render citations from them unhelpful,60 sticking to
elementary scholarly principles could help minimize that.
Finally, the task of evaluating and recording the law has a moral
dimension to it. As Reisman put it,
International law is based on consent, which is a healthy and
democratic feature. Actors are not bound by law unless they agree
to it. They can agree explicitly through treaties and conventions
or implicitly—through practice. Just as it would be intellectually
dishonest and profoundly immoral to try to impose a contract on
a party that had never agreed to it, it is intellectually dishonest
and immoral to try to reach the same result by pretending that
a customary international rule has been formed, without
systematically determining that state practice accompanied by
the necessary attitudes has generated a customary rule.61

V. Conclusion
The writers on international law have made—and continue to
make—an extraordinary contribution to the discipline. None of what
has gone before is to rob their work of the confidence and creativity
that ought to guide it, nor is it suggested that the law must always be
found, rather than made. Instead, the point here being emphasized is
that precisely because of the considerable influence that writings can
and do exert, academic discourse on international law ought to be
“trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.”62 Scholarship
advocating for a progressive conception of international law can and
should be a powerful vehicle for desirable change, but its authors must
not arrogate for themselves a legislative function that they do not have.
The formal role of writings as a “subsidiary means for the determination
of rules of international law,” as John Fischer Williams wrote in 1939,
is the expression of “an acceptance by states of the importance of the
contribution which individuals of light, leading, and authority, not
acting consciously by or on behalf of states, do in fact make to

60.

See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 9, at 24; see also Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, 75–76 (Feb. 14)
(joint separate opinion of Higgins, J., Kooijmans, J., and Buergenthal, J.);
The Renard (1778) 165 Eng. Rep. 51, 52 (“A pedantic man in his closet
dictates the law of nations; and who shall decide, when doctors disagree?
Bynkershoek, as it is natural to every writer or speaker who comes after
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international law.”63 These words remind us what it is that all writers
on international law, when picking up their pen, should aspire to do.

63.

JOHN FISCHER WILLIAMS, ASPECTS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 58
(1939) (referring also to the other so-called subsidiary means listed in
Article 38.1(d) of the ICJ Statute, judicial decisions).
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